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1. Introduction
It has been hypothesized that the evolution of
modern human cognition was catalyzed by the
development of jointly intentional modes of be-
haviour.1,2,3 From an early age (1-2 years), human
infants outperform apes at tasks that involve col-
laborative activity.4,5 Specifically, human infants
excel at joint action motivated by reasoning of the
form “we will do X” (shared intentions6,7,8), as
opposed to reasoning of the form “I will do X [be-
cause he is doing X]” (individual intentions). The
mechanism behind the evolution of shared inten-
tionality is unknown. Here we formally model the
evolution of jointly intentional action and show
under what conditions it is likely to have emerged
in humans. Modelling the interaction of hunter-
gatherers as a coordination game9, we find that
when the benefits from adopting new technolo-
gies or norms are low but positive, the sharing of
intentions does not evolve, despite being a mutu-
alistic behaviour10 that directly benefits all par-
ticipants. When the benefits from adopting new
technologies or norms are high, such as may be
the case during a period of rapid environmen-
tal change11,12, shared intentionality evolves and
rapidly becomes dominant in the population. Our
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results shed new light on the evolution of collab-
orative behaviours.
2. Model
We summarize here the model. Details can be
found in Supplementary Information.13 Following
Bowles, Choi & Bowles,14,15 consider a metapop-
ulation comprising m partially isolated subpopu-
lations (called demes) of size n individuals. Each
individual either has the ability to share inten-
tions (type SI) or does not (type N). Time is di-
vided into generations, each of which comprises T
periods. Individuals live for a single generation.
Consider a given deme. At the start of a genera-
tion, the deme has achieved a level of technologi-
cal/cultural sophistication τ . This will change as
time passes, as will the share of SI and N types in
the populations. That is, the model (summarized
in Figure 1) is one of gene-culture coevolution.
2.1. Within-deme interaction
The interaction structure within a deme is given
by an undirected graph on the set of individuals in
the deme. This is determined at the start of each
generation, the idea being that for each individual
there are a few individuals with whom he has a
high degree of interaction (relatives, friends, hunt-
ing partners).16,17,18 At any one time, any given
individual plays one of two strategies, the ‘old’
technology, or a ‘new’ technology. For each neigh-
bour who plays the same strategy as he does, he
gains a interaction-payoff of either 1 (old-old) or
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ατ > 1 (new-new). That is, his payoffs in each
interaction are given by the coordination game
in Table 1. His payoff is then the average of his
interaction-payoffs from each neighbour. ατ rep-
resents the within-deme relative fitness benefits of
technology τ + 1 compared to technology τ .
2.2. Strategy updating
Strategies are updated by single individuals but
also by pairs of individuals who can share their
intentions. A pair of players can only share in-
tentions if both players in the pair are SI types
and they are neighbours on the interaction graph.
Each period within a generation, either one indi-
vidual or one pair of individuals is randomly se-
lected to update their strategy. An updating in-
dividual or pair of individuals plays a coalitional
better response, adjusting their strategies so that
by doing so they obtain payoffs at least as high
as their current payoffs, holding the strategies of
all the other individuals fixed.19,20 However, when
any individual has the opportunity to update his
strategy, he will with some small probability make
a mistake and switch to a random strategy instead
of to his intended strategy.21
Note that type (SI or N) does not dictate strat-
egy choice, as it does in traditional evolutionary
game theory.22,23 Neither does type affect any in-
dividual’s preferences over profiles of strategies as
it does in the literature on evolution of prefer-
ences.24 What type does here is to alter, by en-
abling or disabling pairwise updating, the set of
strategy profiles that can be reached by any given
update. Note that the SI type only affects be-
haviour in the presence of other SI types and that
the behaviour manifested by pairs of SI types is
mutualistic, in that both participants gain from
it (in contrast to altruistic behaviour10,25,26,27).
2.3. Technology adoption
Following strategy updating, payoffs for the
current period are realized for all individuals. Fol-
lowing this, if the proportion of the individuals in
a deme playing ‘new’ is 90% or higher, we say that
the new technology has been adopted, technology
τ + 1 is now the deme’s current technology, and
Old New
Old 1 0
New 0 ατ
Table 1: Payoffs to within-deme interactions,
when the deme has current technology level τ .
ατ > 1. Entries are interaction-payoffs of an in-
dividual whose strategy is given by the row when
interacting with an individual whose strategy is
given by the column.
we reset the strategies of every individual in the
deme to ‘old’.
2.4. Deme extinction
At the end of each generation, with probabil-
ity η, any given deme faces an invader. The in-
vader is another deme chosen at random. If the
invader has a higher technology level than the in-
vaded deme, then the invader replaces the invaded
deme. The invaded deme becomes extinct and is
replaced with a replica (types, current payoffs and
tech level) of the invader. This can represent the
possibility of violent conflict between demes, but
can equally be considered to model differing ex-
tinction and expansion rates of demes with access
to different technology.
2.5. Reproduction
Following the extinction phase, each deme re-
produces according to a finite population replica-
tor dynamic with mutation rate µ, determining
the shares of SI types in the next generation. For
simplicity, we assume that reproduction is asexual
and haploid. Note that as demes comprise finite
numbers of individuals, genetic drift will have an
effect in demes that contain both SI and N types.
3. Results
Relative to demes with low numbers of SI types,
demes with high numbers of SI types are slow to
adopt new technology when ατ is low, but fast
to adopt new technology when ατ is high. The
former effect arises because, when ατ is low, SI
types playing ‘new’ can coordinate mutually prof-
itable switches back to ‘old’ even when it would
2
not be profitable for any individual acting alone to
make such a switch (Figure 2b). Conversely, when
ατ is high, SI types playing ‘old’ can coordinate
switches to ‘new’ that would not be profitable for
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Figure 1: a: Demes begin a generation with given
technology and number of SI types. b: Interac-
tion during a generation gives individual fitnesses
and causes advances in deme technology (here,
demes A and C increase their tech level). c:
Some demes (here, deme B) face invasion by other
demes (deme A). If the invading deme has higher
technology, the invaded deme is eliminated and
replaced by a replica of the invading deme (here,
deme B is eliminated and replaced by deme D, a
replica of deme A). d: Demes reproduce and pop-
ulate the next generation via a finite population
replicator dynamic (here, we see within-deme se-
lection and genetic drift in demes A and D chang-
ing the number of SI types). e: Technology levels
and number of SI types are carried forward into
the next generation.
any individual acting alone (Figure 2c).
Hence, if ατ remains low (conversely, high)
over enough generations, then demes with high
numbers of SI types will fall behind (conversely,
pull ahead) of demes with low numbers of SI
types when it comes to technological advance-
ment. When SI-poor demes lead in technology,
they will outperform SI-rich demes in conflict, and
SI will be selected against in the metapopulation.
When SI-rich demes lead in technology, the oppo-
site will occur.
When ατ is low, mutation and genetic drift
eventually cause some demes to have low num-
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Figure 2: Blue-coloured vertices represent indi-
viduals playing ‘new’, white vertices represent in-
dividuals playing ‘old’. Individuals not shown are
assumed to be playing ‘old’. a: In the absence of
SI, the only better response for any individual is
to retain his current strategy. b: For low α, coali-
tions of SI type individuals can coordinate payoff
improving switches back to ‘old’. c: For high α,
coalitions of SI type individuals can coordinate
payoff improving switches to ‘new’.19 Note that
threshold values of α depend on graph structure
and that different interaction structures can yield
different thresholds.19,28
3
bers of SI types. These demes gain a technologi-
cal advantage over other demes, type N becomes
dominant and type SI becomes scarce (Figures
3a, 4-Phase I). Conversely, when ατ is high, mu-
tation, genetic drift, and within deme selection
of SI cause some demes to have high numbers
of SI types. These demes gain a technological
advantage and type SI becomes dominant (Fig-
ures 3b, 4-Phase II). These results hold regard-
less of the initial proportions of SI and N types
in the population. Our results indicate that an
extended period of environmental change lead-
ing to elevated within-deme fitness benefits from
innovation would have sufficed for SI to become
widespread.
4. Discussion
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this
is the first paper to formally model the evolu-
tion of collaborative ability, although the work
of Bacharach29 makes tentative steps in this di-
rection. Collaboration directly alters how strate-
gies are chosen, not which strategies are chosen,
and although the former affects the latter, how
it does so depends on circumstances. The insight
we derive, by explicitly modelling techno-cultural
advance, is to link technology adoption to the evo-
lution of collaboration.
As might be expected, large gains from tech-
nological adaptation facilitate the evolution of SI.
However, when benefits from new technology are
low, collaboration works against a community by
slowing its technological advance, even when all
members of the community have perfectly aligned
interests. Previous literature has discussed how
interaction structure can have important impli-
cations for cumulative culture.30,18,31 Our model
provides a novel mechanism for this: the social
structure within demes combines with the pres-
ence or absence of shared intentions and the ex-
ogenous technological opportunities of the epoch
(α) to give varying rates of techno-cultural accu-
mulation. Furthermore, although this study con-
siders the plausible case of scale free social net-
works17, there exist a large range of social struc-
tures, both regular and random, for which the
‘conservative’ and ‘reforming’ effects of Figure 2
are observed.19,28
The collaborative sharing of intentions is mutu-
alistic, not altruistic: both parties gain from the
pairwise adjustment of strategies. Moreover, we
look at coordination games, not prisoner’s dilem-
mas. There are no gains to be made from cheat-
ing. Despite this, we have seen that the emergence
of SI is far from assured. Thus our model gives a
mechanism by which inter-species (e.g. chimp vs.
human) differences in benefits from new technolo-
gies could lead to diversity in the ability to share
intentions. Such differences in the gains from
technological advance could arise from physical
differences between species, or from differences in
environmental variability.11,12
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Figure 4: Starting with each individual equiprobably SI or N type under benchmark conditions, a:
Mean and standard deviation of fraction of SI type individuals across all 64 demes and 10 replicates
during generations 451 to 500, b: Average rates of technological change (steps per generation) across
all 64 demes and 10 replicates over generations 451 to 500.
Determinant Range Comment/method of estimation
Number of demes m 64 Typical number of languages/dialects in an AIATSIS linguistic zone13
Effective deme size (one-third of census size) n 32 Per previous estimates14,18
Average number of neighbours per individual d 4,6, 8 Degree of scale-free graph (social network)13
Within-deme fitness benefits of new technology α 1.2− 4.0 Depends on technology/norm under consideration
Periods per generation T 2000 2 updates per week over 20 years
Maximum coalition size for strategy updating k 2, 3, 4 Pairwise updating (benchmark) and small coalitions28,13
Mistake rate in strategy updating ε 0.025,0.05, 0.10 One mistake every 10-40 updates (benchmark 20)
Mutation rate from SI to N and vice versa µ 0.001 For simulation purposes. For lower rates adjust timescales accordingly
Per generation conflict probability η 0.05,0.10, 0.15 Similar to previous estimates14,13
Table 2: Parameter estimates. Benchmark values are in bold.
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